An Inside Look at Ottomans, Islam, Syria and Turkey

Emrah Sahin is the Turkish Studies lecturer at UF's Center for European Studies. A portion of this interview was featured in the UF campus newspaper, the Alligator. The interview was conducted by CES intern, Ann Manov. Ann is a UF French, English and Spanish senior. Her column appears in the Alligator on Mondays.

AM: Why is Turkish studies housed in UF’s Center for European Studies?

ES: A Turk probably couldn't say if he is Middle Eastern or European. Politically, economically, if not socially or culturally, Turkey is part of the European civilization.

AM: Turkey has the second highest number of diplomatic missions in the world, after the US, and most of recent increase has come from contact with the Middle East. Politically, is Turkey becoming less European?

ES: Turkey’s journey into the EU is checkered. In the early 1990s  the EU began to dictate conditions [beyond the Copenhagen criteria] for Turkey. But Turks have always wanted to be in the European civilization, a symbol of modernity. They are not less European than new EU member nations.

AM: When did Turkey begin emulating Europe? 

ES: From 1839 to the 1870s, the Tanzimat reforms sought to cure the Ottoman Empire, the “sick man" of Europe, by modernizing the military, society, and the administration.

AM: How does the problem of Kurdish integration have its roots in the Ottoman period?

ES: In the “millet” system, Sunni Kurds were part of the broader Muslim community. In the late 19th century, Kurds and Armenians [in eastern Turkey] attributed economic crises to each other, and disorder erupted. But today’s Kurdish question relates to identity. After the Republic of Turkey was established [in 1923], the Kurdish population ended up being the only minority in Turkey, as population exchanges sent Greek subjects to Greece.

AM: Were the population exchanges done on religious lines?

ES: They were done more on ethnic lines. Atatürk, the founder of Turkey, would not have imagined Turkey as a Muslim state; it was a European-inspired, secular Turkey where Islam was buried with the Ottoman Empire.  The new generation of scholars would receive education in Europe and replace Islam with rational sciences and positivism.

AM: What is it about Turkish Islam that makes it the only Muslim democracy?

ES:  Muhammed structured the first Islamic state upon democratic tenets. But the Turkish model became successful paradoxically by the introduction of secularism by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey's leading founder. Today, secularism also preserves the right to religion. Referencing EU standards of non-interference in religion, the government permitted religious symbols on campuses. So, Turkey historically applied a strict form of secularism, but the groups that hold power define it. When Turkey abolished the caliphate in 1924, several Ottoman-educated scholars revolted. The republican founders changed the dress code and replaced the Arabic alphabet with the Latin version. Secularism proved strict for the first generation who went through this top-down revolution.

Most practicing, devout Turks take no issue with democracy. This is a legacy of Atatürk. The current generation of Turks believe that democracy is the ideal form of government. The secularism established by Atatürk todays takes another turn that preserves the right to religion.

  

AM: By the time of Atatürk’s revolution, was there already a solid Turkish identity? Did the pan-Turkic movement change what Ottomans would have called Turkish?

ES: In the late Ottoman context there were a number of ideological streams: pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islam, and pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism remained feasible in the face of ethnic revolts in Serbia and Greece: why not copy that ideology and create a Turkish empire? The republic was founded on Turkism; not pan-Turkism of all Turkic peoples. Turkism promised a nation based on linguistic, ethnic and cultural unity. 

AM: Is establishing that Turkish identity why Kurds had to stop speaking Kurdish?

ES: Atatürk's Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, declared any citizen in Turkey to be a Turk. This did not reflect the desire to "Turkify" the Kurds. Being a Turkish citizen came with a strict state dictation: Turkish is the language.The current government, in an effort to smooth relations, reminded the Kurds and the Turks of their common religion and collective memory. But the conflict goes deeper. 

AM: Was it the Justice and Development Party (Ak Parti) that first allowed Kurdish language schooling and TV?

ES: Yes. That was part of its multiculturalist policy. When they first won the elections [in 2002], Ak Parti actively pursued EU talks and gave liberties to Kurds and women. The PKK—the Kurdistan Workers Party—has fought for over three decades for an independent Kurdistan including southern Turkey and northern Iraq. The Turkish government tried to grant certain rights to the Kurdish population, such as allowing Kurdish language radio broadcasts and public service. But later on, the government abandoned reconciliation. Broader events in the region played a role, especially the events in Syria and the reactions from the PKK.

AM: Why is it strategic for the Ak Parti to turn against the Kurds now? Could you recap the elections this summer?

ES: The Turkish position on the Kurds, especially the PKK, a terrorist group in Turkey, began to change after the elections. The Kurdish party, called the People's Democratic Party (HDP) argues for greater reforms but also supports Kurdish independence. After June 7th, HDP won about 13.12% of the popular vote and 80 parliament seats. Ak Parti  cadres seemed frustrated by PKK negotiations and unilaterally ended talks. My fear is that political intolerance might affect the larger, favorable Turkish perception of the Kurds.

AM: How do you think Ak Parti’s recent policies affect their chances of EU accession?

ES: They seem to have shelved the prospect of joining the EU, especially in the 2010s. Europe is partly responsible. Some procedures were intentionally dictated to make it increasingly difficult for Turkey to gain accession into the European Union. Erdoğan grew exhausted with EU expectations. Last year he even challenged the EU by saying, ‘Take us or we will otherwise partner with the Shanghai-5.’

AM: What makes Erdoğan charismatic?

ES: The way he dictates policies, electrifying speeches, and the way he connects intellectuals and bureaucrats, along with party members, under his authority. The opponents of Erdoğan focus on his background. He grew up in a neighborhood of laborers, not intellectual elites. He is stubborn and straightforward, and not extremely sophisticated in his political decisions.

AM: Do you think that Turkey is becoming more conservative across the board, or just the Ak Parti?

ES: Turkey is polarizing along ethnic, political, and religious lines. Erdoğan recently waged a battle against the Gülenist movement, calling them the parallel state. That’s a huge, ongoing battle between two types of Turkish Islam, one more political and the other more socially-oriented.

AM: Because of Gülenist schools?

ES: Yes, but Erdoğan said that they also conquered the state within the state by putting leaders of the Gülen Movement into strategic positions within the army and even Ak Parti ranks. Another battle is against PKK and HDP, and another against MHP, the National Movement Party. The regional status quo seems to be deteriorating and internal politics are not getting any better.

AM: The UNHCR estimates that by the end of 2015, there will be 1.7 million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.

ES: Turkish sources confirm it is already two million. It’s not a simple refugee problem; it’s Turkey’s new minority.

AM: Do you think Syria’s Ottoman past will help them integrate? Is there any prospect of a stable minority status?

ES: Syria was part of the semi-independent, Arabic-speaking province of Damascus. People spoke Arabic and worked outside of domestic Ottoman agricultural and commercial networks. Today’s minority issue exacerbates political instability and regional insecurity in Turkey, as Turks spot Syrians everywhere in the country. There we face a language barrier, economic hardships, and unregulated settlement. Turkey expected the EU to help but it did not come this year and the proposed solutions don’t seem to address the magnitude of the refugee crisis.

AM: Sweden said it would take all of them.

ES: Well, we will see. Turkey has historically opened its arms to the oppressed, such as the Jews escaping from Europe during the Second World War. Having the European continent as a union prevents any EU member from acting rapidly and unilaterally; Turkey had that option to help—and did, at the risk of discomforting the Turkish nation. Once again they have opened their border. People living in border towns are not thrilled with this because the refugee flow destroys their business and because ISIL is targeting their towns. It is an unfinished story and we will see in 2016 how it will be resolved, if it ever can be.